Introduction
There is now a wide and ample literature which has explored the relationship between a racialised, ethnicised and xenophobic construction of 'Europeaness', an emphasis on security, the absence of proactive human rights legislation, and the development of restrictive immigration policies in Europe (e.g. Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991; Cholewinski, 2003; Huysmans, 2000; Karyotis, 2003; Kostakopolou, 2000; Tesfahuny, 1998) .
1 While these critical analyses are absolutely essential as an antidote to current EU policies, few academic studies have explored comprehensively European policy developments with respect to 'illegal' immigration 2 since the Treaty of Amsterdam, preferring to focus on legally resident Third Country Nationals instead (for exceptions, see Cholewinski, 2000 Cholewinski, , 2003 and Mitsilegas, 2002) . 3 This paper seeks to redress this lacuna and outlines a new geopolitics of ('illegal') immigration that concerns both a rescaling of decision-making (often referred to as 'communatarisation' which has been discussed extensively in terms of legal immigration), and a little explored re-scaling of control to third countries. 4 In both cases, the evidence of 'securitarianism' is strong. As Cholewinski (2003) points out, overall, the bulk of legally-binding measures and 'soft law' that has emerged since 1999 has neglected human rights and is mainly concerned with preventing migrants without the necessary documents from entering the EU or facilitating their return or expulsion if they do. Thus, the aim is certainly not to deny this securitarian emphasis -I even reinforce it. Yet, by drawing on some familiar concepts within the migration literature, and a theory of political economy from economic anthropology, I present a new conceptual frame for situating this securitarianism. Specifically, I deploy a set of 1 In this paper, I shall use immigration and migration interchangeably, except where noted. In the latter case, immigration will refer to temporary or more permanent settlement while migration shall denote movements or intentions to move across international boundaries. 2 I use the term illegal between quotation marks because first, of the aversion to the term illegal by many immigrants themselves. Second, because of the claim by critical legal scholars that it is impossible to be illegal, in the sense that if an individual falls foul of national law, that individual becomes a subject of international law. Third, in the US, the term 'undocumented' is often used to denote illegal migrants, but this has a precise meaning in EU policy. That is, it refers to those illegal migrants who are without the necessary documents, and this has specific consequences for individuals, especially in terms of potential deportation (for a similar discussion, see Black, 2003) .
However, for the purposes of simplicity, I will cease to use quotation marks around the term illegal after this introduction. 3 Apap, de Bruycker, and Schmitter (2000) discuss regularisation programmes across EU member states, but there is little discussion of EU-level developments. 4 For one exception, see Peers (2003) .
processes that I shall call the 'three Vs': 'virtualism', 'venue-shopping', and '(very) remote control', in order to understand this emerging geo-politics.
This paper is divided into three parts. The first part of this paper explores the three Vs. I maintain that these three processes have shaped policy-making within the two types of re-scaling alluded to above. I follow in the second section with a selective account of policy developments in the realm of 'illegal' immigration, especially since the 2001 Laeken European Council. It charts the gradual communatarisation of the control of illegal immigration (that is, the re-scaling of decision-making), while the third part examines the re-scaling of control to third countries.
Theoretical considerations: the nature of illegal immigration and the three Vs
The nature of illegal immigration
Illegal immigration as an analytical category is somewhat odd because ultimately it is an epiphenomenon of migration and citizenship policy. Or as many observers argue, illegal immigration is produced. There can be no illegal immigration without immigration policy, and thus those who are deemed to be 'illegal', 'irregular', 'sans papiers' or 'undocumented' shifts with the nature of immigration policy (Black, 2003; Cohen, 2003; Samers, 2003) . Consequently, illegal immigration has two characteristics: it is intimately connected with the policies of legal migration and citizenship more generally, but precisely because of its epiphenomenal character, it also becomes an explicitly juridical and police matter. But the latter itself assumes two forms: prevention of entry and regulation of settlement.
In this respect, there is considerable conflation within the popular press (if not academic accounts and actual policy) of the various types of 'illegality' (e.g. Huysmans, 2000) . There are those who 'overstay', those who have 'lost' their documents, those who falsify their documents, those who enter a national territory clandestinely, rejected asylum-seekers, and more generally, the socio-legal 'grey area' between illegal status and asylum-seeking status. These distinctions and the fact that illegal immigration is produced, implies that member states and EU-level institutions are attempting to halt a phenomenon that they themselves produce. Certainly, it could be argued that this is obvious -any regulations will therefore produce 'illegality', and it is much the work of smugglers and traffickers and informal labour market demand, as it is the product of controlling it, the popular press not so much reporting it, as they are both creating it. In other words, illegal immigration is created through popular and governmental arguments such as 'we need to reduce the number of bogus asylum-seekers' (i.e. so-called 'economic migrants'); 'firm but fair' immigration policies; the construction of 'artificial (or indeed virtual) borders' where once commerce and people routinely crossed with ease;
(conventional) conceptions of how labour markets operate (e.g. linear push-pull theories relating to the supply and demand for labour); and the economic evaluation of immigration based on a cost versus benefit rationality (e.g. viewing illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers as 'scroungers' burdening restructured and cash-poor welfare systems).
One of the many effects of these circulating discourses is that in some European countries, migrants who may actually be entitled to asylum, are entering and staying clandestinely because they believe Europe is indeed a Fortress -a Fortress constructed on the various 'models' of the way in which European and third country societies 'work' or should work.
Venue-shopping
Virginie Guiraudon (2000) has argued that a security agenda within the EU is pursued by what she calls 'venue-shopping'. In terms of our purposes here, she has argued that security issues are becoming increasingly dominant as a specific form of venue-shopping is taking place. That is, domestic actors involved in the management of migration remove immigration from public debate and policy-making is shifted upwards into inter-governmental co-operative bodies at the European level that are dominated by the security agendas of interior ministers (see also Cholewinski, 2000; Lavenex, 2000) .
(Very) remote control
Zolberg's 'remote control' (or very remote control as I call it) refers to at-adistance control (rather than simply control at the borders of the advanced economies).
He has in mind for example, the Dublin Convention's 'first country' and 'third safe country rules' and the stationing of customs agents in Latin American or eastern European transport hubs in order to prevent would-be illegal immigrants and asylumseekers from ever reaching the shores of northern countries. I maintain in this paper that remote control has become increasingly important because of the apparent rise in smuggling and trafficking. (Lavenex, 2001, 854;  see also Wallace, 2000, 33-5) . This sort of intensive transgovermentalism is represented in part by the proliferation of inter-governmental cooperative groups such as the Ad Hoc Immigration Group, the Schengen Group, and the JHA EU working groups. They develop outside the Community framework. They are secretive and for the most part do not have to answer to judicial control by for example, the EP or the ECJ. These have proliferated over the last 10 years as national governments have either progressively lost (or perceived to have lost) control over migration flows because of more liberal nationallevel jurisprudence. That is, they seek compensation for this putative lack of control by fortifying borders through (for example police) cooperation and thus repelling migrants and would-be asylum-seekers even before they can reach the shores of member states.
Headed by an agenda of interior ministers, this sort of up-scaled cooperative securitarian approach also provides leverage by providing international legitimacy to domestic 5 However, the Convention on a European Constitution has called for changes in decisionmaking, including the extension of qualified majority voting and co-decision to replace some policies, such as immigration policy which are currently subject to unanimity (Kostakopolou, 2000; CEC, 2003b) .
constituencies (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; Koslowski, 1998; Lavenex, 2001 Here too, the themes were nearly identical to those of the plan set out at Laeken and those of the Santiago Plan. The following discussion then, is organised around the themes of the pre-Thessaloniki document (above), including visa policy, border control policy, key flanking measures, operational co-operation and exchange of information;
partnership with third countries, return policy, and financial resources for burden sharing. For the moment however, I will only be concerned to discuss the first 4 of these 7 areas of policy development. Two of the remaining three areas (return policy and partnership with third countries) will be discussed under the rubric of 're-scaling control'
in the third part of this paper. of guidelines for the development of the VIS (Visa Information System). According to the Commission, it has been designed to dissuade 'visa shopping', improve visa consultation and the delivery of the common visa policy, facilitate the application of the Dublin II regulation and return procedures 12 , and enhance internal security and antiterrorist measures (CEC, 2003a; CEU, 2003) . The VIS seeks to provide a common technical platform with SIS II 13 , without delaying the formation of the latter. However, while there is a precedence for funding and development for SIS II, the VIS is an entirely new system, and it is not surprising that while the Commission is committed to both projects, it is prioritising SIS II because it lies at the foundation of Schengen cooperation.
The basic elements of the VIS (biometric identifiers such as iris scanning, facial recognition and fingerprints, financing, system architecture and so forth) are scheduled to be outlined by December 2003 at the latest. It is intended that they will include a C-VIS (Central Visa System) and a N-VIS (National Visa system). For both systems, it is estimated that it will cost the EU 130 to 200 million Euros, but much of this will be borne by national governments (CEC, 2003a) .
Border control policy
If the 'three Vs' constitute one means of understanding the geopolitics of immigration policy, then certainly the reinforcement of external borders is also about 'compensatory measures' for the liberalization of the EU's internal borders (e.g. Mitsilegas, 2002) . Thus, it is not surprising that border policy, like visa policy, is also one of the most highly developed policy domains in the EU. Article 7 and Article 47 of the Schengen Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement called for closer 12 The Dublin II regulation (adopted by the Council of Ministers on 18 February 2003) replaces the original Dublin Convention (1990). Dublin II is a regulation which will assist in the determination of which member state is responsible for processing an asylum-seekers' claim, as well as forcing the responsible state to accept the return of an asylum-seeker (within a limited and specified time period) who is residing illegally in another member state. It will be aided by the EURODAC (European Automated Fingerprint Recognition System) regulation, which will finger print all asylum-seekers 14 years and older, as well as all those who cross the EU's external borders illegally. Member states would have the option of sending a record of these fingerprints to a central EURODAC database 
Key-flanking measures
The key-flanking measures primarily involve the relationship between illegal immigration and smuggling and trafficking, undeclared work, and carrier liability. Let me begin with smuggling and trafficking.
First, in the thinking of European institutions smuggling and trafficking are not interchangeable phenomena, the latter usually involving some sort of 'exploitation' related to work in the destination country (for further discussions, see Piotrowicz, 2002; Salt, 2000) . And while they are actually separate offences under law, they often overlap in practice. Consequently, the Commission argues that the relationship between smuggling and trafficking should be clearly specified, but the two should be part of a coherent EU For the European Commission, undeclared work appears to be on the increase.
It is seen as 'undermining the financing and delivery of public services' while it is also viewed as a 'pull factor' for illegal immigration (EC, 1998 ; but see Samers, 2001 Samers, , 2003 Spanish government which would require carriers to provide a list of passengers coming into the EU as well as a list of all third country nationals who do not return on the date specified by their travel documents (Cholewinski, 2003) .
.
Operational co-operation and exhange of information
The Furthermore, Commission proposals have rested on the following premise:
"Bearing in mind that any action to counter irregular migratory flows should take place as close as possible to the irregular migrants concerned, the European Union (EU) is promoting actions in, and support actions of, countries of origin and transit" (cited in "Wide-ranging action plan adopted to combat illegal immigration at the EU level, in http://www.europa.eu.int).
Indeed, the last few European Council meetings have introduced and begun the implementation of a range of programmes under the general rubric of the EU's 'external policy'. The idea is that international coordination will be enhanced both at the preventive level (e.g. exchanges of information) and the reactive level (e.g. joint investigations against smuggling and repatriation of illegal immigrants). The Third Country governments themselves appear to be willing (and even eager) to cooperate, in part because they are beginning to voice concern that their own countries are becoming destination points for 'transit' and illegal immigration.
In this respect, considerable financial assistance has been offered by the EU to third countries for "reinforcing their external border and promoting institutional and administrative capacity for managing migration" (EC, 2003, 12) , and most of the In general, the use of foreign policies to tackle the 'root causes' of illegal immigration to the advanced economies is a new phenomenon (Weiner and Munz, 1997) . 24 The Council identified nine countries that would require more intensified cooperative measures. These included Albania, China, the former Republic of Serbia and Montenegro, Morocco, Russia, Tunisia, Ukraine, Libya and Turkey, although it also argued that there were a Countries in the field of migration") within the general EU budget was established for the first time in 2001 to offer further financial assistance outside the more generic development transfers (EC, 2003e, 2003f) . In fact, at Thessaloniki, it was agreed that E140 million would be spent on increased border checks and the creation of a database of EU visas and E250 million for assistance to countries that agree to accept the return of their nationals from EU countries (Migration News, September 2003) . In light of this, the Commission intends to submit a proposal to the Council that would create a "legal basis establishing a multiannual cooperation programme with third countries in the field of immigration". This additional financing is designed to provide origin and transit countries with the necessary means to sign future readmission agreements (EC, 2003a, 13) . And yet, as Cholewinski (2003) perniciously ambiguous and open-ended terminology reflects a 'stick' rather than a 'carrot' approach to cooperation with third countries…" (p. 14) 25 .
In any case, the development-migration programmes that have emerged include TACIS, MEDA, EUROMED, CARDS, PHARE, ASEM, the INTERREG community initiative, and the Cotonou Agreement among ACP countries. I briefly discuss these programmes below. The TACIS programme (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States -that is the former Soviet Union) focuses on three key issues: the development of comprehensive border management, combating drug trafficking, and the construction of anti-corruption measures in the cooperating states, which the EU argues is likely to have an impact on illegal migration. Similarly, there is The New Tacis Regional Programme (for Central Asia) which is to include cooperation on migration and related issues, in particular improvement of border management capacities; and construction of border crossings in the three border region of the Ferghana Valley (eastern Uzbekistan). MEDA refers to a Justice and Home Affairs whole slew of other origin and transit countries which demanded attention, particularly the accession countries and neighbouring Mediterranean countries (EC, 2003; EC, 2003d) . 25 Indeed, Statewatch notes that adopted EU plans "included detailed statistics showing the size and age structure, life expectancy and infant mortality of the population, imports and exports to and from the EU and the rest of the world, GDP, development aid and existing trade cooperation and readmission agreements -all of which are to be used to cajole those countries into accepting EU readmission policies" (2003, 73) . .
Regional Programme which involves the Mediterranean region, and is aimed at building a common and comprehensive policy on immigration (especially smuggling and trafficking) in, from, and between that region, while at the same time pursuing the development of joint police enquiries using the EUROMED network, at southern Mediterraean ports. EUROMED is a network of data collection and research on migratory phenomena, and once again is intended to focus on southern Mediterranean ports in order to exchange information on suspected smuggling and trafficking networks, especially from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa. The CARDS regional programme Ministers will in the future focus expressly on issues of illegal immigration (CEC, 2002d; 2003i; Development Strategies -IDC, 2003 ). Yet, the ACP countries protested that the 26 More specifically, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stipulations in Lomé IV (and later the Contonou Agreement) which forced states to readmit migrants, were not legal, but they had little choice but to sign the agreement (Statewatch, 2003) .
In short -the EU's external policy is producing a new geography of remote control, which extends beyond carrier sanctions and placing customs officials in third country airports.
It would be a gross mistake at this stage not to discuss the case of certain Eastern European countries. While the above programmes involve some Eastern European countries, the immediate accession countries (especially Poland and the Czech Republic)
involve a different set of issues and priorities, especially the pressure felt from European institutions to apply the Schengen acquis and to satisfy the new EU visa directives. and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). 27 The Polish government has had some reluctance to implement the EU's visa policies, especially in relation to the Ukraine with which it has a unique relationship. Similarly, the Hungarian government does not wish to impose visa restrictions on Romanians, Ukrainians, and migrants from the former Yugoslav Republics, because of the large number of ethnic Hungarians living in these countries, thus contradicting the emerging EU visa regime (Mitsilegas, 2002) . 28 This is somewhat of a moving target, as Mitsilegas (2002) 
Discussion and conclusions
31 Although, as Cholewinski (2003) points out, the criteria are rather general so that there is considerable flexibility in the system, which in turn may have a discriminatory effect on the migrants involved.
This paper responds to the dearth of studies that discuss actual policy developments in the EU with regard to 'illegal' immigration. In this sense, I sought to outline two different, but related developments. The first is the gradual communatarisation of policies relating to illegal immigration. That is, I sought to demonstrate a re-scaling of decision-making with respect to the creation of (illegal) immigration since Amsterdam, and to document the substantive nature of the policies that have accompanied this communatarisation. What is clear, as Guild (2003) points out, is that the Council of Ministers has had far more 'success' in reaching agreements on illegal immigration, than in other areas of immigration. As a result, there seems to be a deepening and widening of control since the Treaty of Amsterdam, as so many observers of European immigration policy have described and envisioned.
Second, I argued that there has been a re-scaling of control to third countries, a spatial extension of control far from the EU's existing external borders. This is not simply a case of placing police and customs officials in third country airports -as Zolberg so cogently points out, but rather the gradual implementation of a system of migration management aligned with development assistance in third countries. I suggested further that Guiraudon's notion of 'venue-shopping' in terms of migration policy can be expanded from her original meaning (that is an up-scaling of control from member states to the security-obsessed Council and its satellite working groups) to the 'shipping out' of the control agenda to third countries. I conjectured that it might be far easier to construct a security agenda abroad far from the watchful eye of Brussels-based NGOs and human rights campaigners, than it is to legitimate it in the EU and its member states. (I am careful though not to exaggerate this claim because, with the exception of critical academics and certain NGOs, there does not seem to be strong opposition from domestic constituencies to 'securitising' member state borders).
Nevertheless, the kernel of this paper is my insistence on the usefulness of Daniel 
